What a Focused OMB Rule Comment Could Look Like

Jun 27

‍I've chosen to post my personal comment on OMB-2026-0034 on this site as an example of what a hyper-focused response to the rule might look like.

Given the rule’s breadth, there is no need to “boil the ocean.” Focus on an impact you know or care about lot about. This is a regulation that touches more than a trillion dollars of annual federal spending. Go after the regulatory impact analysis. Talk a bit about the Moody’s warning that the rule could make it harder for small towns and hospitals to borrow money. You’re more likely to make an effective comment by focusing on YOUR interests and the things YOU care about.

Without further adieu, my personal comment:

Executive Summary

I am writing to express my opposition to OMB-2026-0034, “Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance” (the Rule), request that it be withdrawn, and urge that the Administration engage in substantially greater due diligence before re-introducing the Rule. The regulation is poorly drafted, internally inconsistent, and fundamentally does not represent an attempt by the Office of Management and Budget to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Nowhere is this more apparent than the inconsistencies within the Rule with respect to international collaboration in research and development.

The observations, here, are non-comprehensive. They serving to primarily illustrate the haphazard way in which the document was drafted and the dramatic impacts that the Rule could have on the functioning of U.S. entities. The examples shown below are intended to demonstrate how the document will warp the behavior of organizations in ways that likely go beyond even the drafters’ intent. What this comment attempts to do is show how changes to the Rule, as envisioned here, can render it impossible for the United States to achieve its science and technology objectives if the Rule is implemented as described.

This comment does not make assertions about the importance of peer review or whether or not political appointees should have a say in grant making. I do not make first amendment, fundamental rights, or constitutional arguments[1]. For the purposes of this specific comment, I have chosen to limit my analysis to what would happen if the document were to be implemented as written, the document’s internal inconsistency, and the potential consequences to a small number of extremely significant U.S. government research investments. My analysis suggests severe impacts impacts (that run contrary to the benefits claimed by the Office of Management and Budget in the accompanying Regulatory Impact Analysis), including the inviability of multi-billion dollar research programs and threats to national security and economic primacy. Finally, the Rule will undermine the ability of the United States to partner with individuals in other countries by introducing terms and restrictions that are incompatible with foreign partners’ requirements.

I would urge a thorough scrub of the document, especially with respect to the ways in which it uses imprecise and poorly-defined language that make it impossible for U.S. organizations reliant on federal financial assistance to apply. At a minimum, the document should be updated to ensure that terms point to definitions elsewhere in the Code of Federal Regulations and re-evaluated to ensure that it does conflict with congressional intent.

Relevant Experience

I am a former U.S. government employee with more than 15 years of experience developing and implementing guidance and regulations in both government and the nonprofit sector. I also have substantial experience negotiating the contractual rules and regulations of foreign countries, particularly the European Union’s Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe research programs and the General Data Protection Regulation. I served as the State Department’s primary action officer on the Long Baseline Neutrino Facility/Deep Underground Neutrino experiment and other major international research projects, which I will go into detail about below[2]. While I have attempted to provide references to relevant public documents in commenting on those programs, some of my knowledge is inherently based on my specialized experience as a U.S. government employee supporting these programs.

I was also instrumental in finalizing the guidelines established under National Security Presidential Memorandum 33[3] and the CHIPS and Science Act[4] as White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Assistant Director for Research Security and Infrastructure, including mitigating potential harm resulting from the uncritical implementation of both (for instance, reducing the potential of Congressionally-mandated definitions from accidentally barring U.S. researchers from receiving the Nobel Prize or forcing the resignation individuals who received degrees or honors during their time at major foreign universities such as Oxford or McGill[5]). As White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Assistant Director for International Science and Technology, I was the primary officer responsible for educating staff and ensuring the agency’s compliance with the Wolf Amendment.

I have significant experience receiving input from companies, academic organizations, and members of the public describing how rules, regulations, and guidelines impact them, especially with respect the ways in which U.S. organizations’ compliance with 2 CFR 200 may conflict with similar rules established by other countries. ‍

I am extremely familiar with how poorly-drafted rules can result in dramatic overcorrections by recipients of U.S. funds in ways that run counter to the national interest.

The Rule is Poorly Drafted

One of the key issues with the Rule is that the authors use broad, imprecise language that make implementation impossible and render the document internally inconsistent. Looking at 200.220(d), “definitions”, the definition of a “covered foreign entity” is described as a foreign adversary, a country of particular concern, or a country subject to sanctions or restrictions relating to national security, defense, or intelligence activities.

The document does not make an attempt to define what a “foreign adversary” or “country of particular concern mean;” in fact, the latter term only appears once in the entire Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and with respect to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. This renders them useless to regulated entities when implementing the Rule.

“Country subject to sanctions or restrictions relating to national security, defense, or intelligence activities”, on the other hand, is theoretically more precise, but only insofar as it’s possible to catalogue the number of countries that are subject to national security, defense, or intelligence activities.

Unfortunately for the Rule and those trying to implement it, all countries are subject to at least one form of restriction relating to national security, defense, or intelligence activities. For instance, both controlled unclassified information and classified information may be designated as “NOFORN”[6], meaning “Information may not be disseminated in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals, foreign or international organizations, or non-U.S. citizens.” Other forms of restrictions can also apply to U.S. allies and adversaries in equal measure, such as export controls, which restrict the export of certain items unless a license is obtained.

‍If one assumes that the broadest possible definition of the word “restriction” is correct (as lawyers at universities seeking to implement the document will be forced to do as a matter of institutional preservation), it renders the document internally inconsistent. The revisions to 200.202 contemplate the participation of foreign entities in the execution of sub-awards: 202.202(e)(4) explicitly states “Nothing in this paragraph (e) prohibits the participation of foreign entities as subrecipients or contractors under a research and development award made to an eligible U.S. entity.” Obviously the Rule cannot both prohibit the use of foreign funds for all countries subject to at least one form of restriction (again, all countries) while also allowing the expenditure of funds for foreign recipients.

Yes, an approval process does exist which could theoretically allow such collaborations to take place, but forcing national security exemptions to be made for all international projects can take significant time, especially if they are subject to mandatory legal reviews while also encouraging organizations to take measures to either avoid or evade requirements[7]. Unnecessary review processes involving close allies and partners creates further administrative log jams and run the risk of undermining the Administration’s own foreign policy objectives, including its technology prosperity memoranda of understanding[8].

Because the recipients of federal funds are required to demonstrate compliance with the regulation in order to receive those funds, they will be encouraged to adopt the most conservative interpretation of the definition that is legally possible so as to not risk running afoul of the definition. While it may be unlikely that the U.S. government would restrict activities with close partners like the United Kingdom or Canada, the uncertainty introduced by such a sweeping definition is likely to dramatically impact our cooperation with such countries, regardless of how the government chooses to implement the Rule without completely rewriting the definition. It is not the responsibility of the American public to have to parse or re-interpret what the Federal government means in order to be compliant with its regulations.

The Rule is Inconsistent With Existing Legislative Mandates

Staying specifically on 200.220 for the purposes of illustration, the Rule is also inconsistent with additional Congressional mandates, even if we apply a more charitable interpretation of the Rule’s definition. The Rule takes the extraordinary step of requiring that authorizations to that section even when collaboration is already authorized by Statute.

The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022[9] establishes new rules for the involvement of researchers who are associated with adversarial countries. While these rules create extensive new restrictions related to the participation of researchers involved in malign foreign talent recruitment programs with the United States, it makes explicit carveouts for the participation of such researchers in a variety of activities.

Consider the carveout language language found in 10632(d) of the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022:

(d) International Collaboration.--Each policy developed under subsection (a, Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs) shall not prohibit, unless such activities are funded, organized, or managed by an academic institution or a foreign talent recruitment program on the lists developed under paragraphs (8) and (9) of section 1286(c) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 4001 note; Public Law 115-232)--

(1) making scholarly presentations and publishing written materials regarding scientific information not otherwise controlled under current law;

(2) participation in international conferences or other international exchanges, research projects or programs that involve open and reciprocal exchange of scientific information, and which are aimed at advancing international scientific understanding and not otherwise controlled under current law;

(3) advising a foreign student enrolled at an institution of higher education or writing a recommendation for such a student, at such student's request; and

(4) other international activities determined appropriate by the Federal research agency head or designee.

It seems unlikely that Congress would bar agencies from developing policies prohibiting the participation of individuals involved in malign foreign talent recruitment programs in federally funded activities involving routine and reciprocal exchanges of scientific information while allowing the Office of Management and budget to issue a government-wide regulation barring the participation of the same individuals from any involvement in any form of federal financial assistance.

Consider the National Science Foundation (NSF) or other similar extramural funding agency. For that agency to comply with both the Rule and Section 10632 of the CHIPS and Science Act, when issuing an award, the agency would need to require that a recipient of a research and development award who is working with individuals involved in a malign foreign talent recruitment program seek authorization from a senior official at the National Science Foundation, who would then be required to issue the authorization.

There is a third possibility that could result from either bad faith implementation of the Rule or fear on the part of the granting official: they could simply decide to sit on their hands and not make a decision in either direction. Such action would have the de facto effect of placing the agency in non-compliance with Section 10632 of the CHIPS and Science Act, as refusing to authorize an activity has the same functional end result as a prohibition.

In my personal experience, uncertainty about which rule a federal officer should follow (or fear that their decision could result in career-impacting political blowback) makes the third possibility the most likely outcome.

The government, of course, has the option of seeking the withdrawal of the language found in the CHIPS and Science Act Section 10632. Doing so would be unwise, for reasons found in the following section of my analysis.

The Rule Has Significant Impacts Unaccounted for in the Regulatory Impact Analysis[10]

This is intended to be illustrative, demonstrating the ways in which the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) fails to account for significant economic impacts or impacts to science. The fact that the impacts to just a single research program supported by Federal Financial Assistance could have billions of dollars of economic impact that is not accounted for in the RIA should demonstrate the need for a much fuller accounting within the Rule.

For the purposes of this section, I will look exclusively at the Long Baseline Neutrino Facility/Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment/Short Baseline Neutrino Program (abbreviated LBNF/DUNE), a $3.2 billion research program and collection of facilities [11] that has been repeatedly funded by Congress. Facilities supporting the activity are located in Read, South Dakota[12]; Batavia, Illinois[13]; and Geneva, Switzerland.[14] More than 1,500 scientists across 35 actively contribute to DUNE[15].

The program competes with similar programs in Japan[16] and China[17]. The program searches for new physics that have the potential to upend our understanding of the universe and have dramatic consequences for the future of science and technology, particularly with respect to quantum information science and technology. A measurement that results in the discovery of new physics is likely to result in major awards or honors, like the Nobel Prize.

The projected economic impacts of LBNF/DUNE were as follows[18]. This has already been impacted by the facility being pushed back from its current timeline. Additional delays would continue to affect the viability of the project.

• $952 million in economic output in South Dakota

• $1,204 million in economic output in Illinois

• $340 million in income for South Dakota households

• $593 million in income for Illinois households.

Discoveries that happen first at the Japanese or Chinese facilities would represent a loss in U.S. competitiveness in the seminal field of high energy physics and call into question the ability of the United States to successfully execute large-scale research activities. The failure of the facilities to make major discoveries or the failure of the facilities as a result of budget impacts would have additional impacts on the United States’ reputation as a preferred partner, which has already suffered from decades of program cancellations[19]. This would influence other countries’ willingness to make in-kind contributions to future U.S. facilities. Taken together, such contributions can total in the hundreds of millions[20], [21]. For LBNF/DUNE, the contributions from India and the United Kingdom, alone, are worth more than $200 million, providing unique capabilities that do not need to be charged to the U.S. taxpayer.

In 2025, I wrote in Issues in Science and Technology [22] about the ways in which authorizations can create significant delays for research and development activities, forcing agencies to spend additional time and effort on authorizations and intergovernmental negotiations that affect the viability of projects reliant on federal funds. At the White House and Department of Commerce, I also observed what happens to projects when fear of issuing an authorization due to unspecified national security concerns, including additional impacts to the health and safety.

The program involves researchers from dozens of countries[23]. For programs of this scale, the viability of the project is tied to country-level participation. If critical members of the consortium are not allowed to participate, or their contributions are delayed (as described in the Issues article cited above), that can have severe consequences for the timeline and execution of the program, as well as its overall viability.

While parts of the program are executed using funds appropriated to the Department of Energy and allocated to Fermi National Laboratory (under what I understand to primarily be the Federal Acquisition regulations), the experiments and supporting research around DUNE comes primarily from awards issued to U.S. and foreign investigators by their governments. Agencies that reasonably could be expected to provide awards to investigators at LBNF include the Department of Energy and National Science Foundation. Financing for research activities done by facility users would be primarily covered by grants subject to the updates to 2 CFR 200.

Without awards supporting research at the facilities, the research will not take place, and the billions of dollars spent by the U.S. government supporting this program would be wasted.

The total value of these awards over the life of the facility, including student careers is not projected, but given the scale of the project in terms of number of scientists over a decade, the amount of those awards is likely in the tens or hundreds of millions. The value of those awards could be diminished, significantly, by the failure of the U.S. government to deliver the facility or major discoveries at the Japanese or Chinese competing facilities. Additionally, the viability of the projects tied to these awards is also tied to who the researchers are allowed to cooperate with.

We can make two assumptions:

• If a U.S. investigator is not permitted to work with a researcher from a foreign country, then they will need to find someone providing equivalent skills elsewhere. Given the unique nature of this research, it is possible that those skills are also unique, damaging the viability of the award and the ability of the program to make major discoveries.

• If foreign investigators are thwarted from collaborating with U.S. researchers, if the process for collaboration is delayed substantially, or awards are not issued to U.S. investigators, then both foreign and U.S. investigators may choose to instead participate in the Japanese or Chinese projects. This is more concerning given that the Chinese facility has already begun producing results and is positioned to make major discoveries[24].

It would be deeply ironic if the impact of the Rule’s provision intended to improve American competitiveness and national security would be the empowerment an adversary’s research program and the reduction of the overall viability of research conducted at a multi-billion dollar facility supported by the U.S. taxpayer.

None of these impacts are accounted for in the Rule or the RIA. Consider the justifications and anticipated costs and benefits offered for the updates to 2 CFR 200.220 mentioned in the RIA:

• “These changes are intended to strengthen national security protections, reduce risk exposure, support domestic research capacity, and ensure that Federal funding supports core programmatic objectives of Federal awards.” (page 2)

• “These changes are intended to improve alignment between Federal funding and programmatic objectives, enhance oversight of Federal expenditures, and ensure that Federal awards are administered in a manner consistent with law and policy.” (page 3)

• “The proposed changes to § 200.220 are expected to increase time costs for staff.” (Page 5)

The RIA makes no mention of costs to the U.S. taxpayer in terms of the viability of multibillion dollar, congressionally-appropriated projects which are inherently designed to be reliant on federal research and development awards which are also reliant on the involvement of international collaborators. While agencies can issue discrete authorizations that allow smaller awards associated with the larger project to move forward, the volume of such awards on a multi-billion dollar project with thousands of international collaborators is likely to introduce significant delays, which may affect the viability of the project and the productivity of American scientists.

As noted in the earlier cited article published in Issues in Science and Technology, such delays are often measured in years, which would have dramatic impacts on the ability of graduate students (in particular) to participate in projects and get relevant training necessary to complete their PhD program. The U.S. program is not the only option. In order to remain on the cutting edge, the researcher in question might be compelled to instead work at the competing projects in China or Japan, thereby increasing the likelihood that major discoveries would happen at non-U.S. facilities.

‍Of the benefits claimed by by the RIA, which include strengthening national security protections, reducing risk exposure, supporting domestic research capacity, and ensuring that Federal funding supports core programmatic objectives of federal funds, the Rule does not contemplate that every single one of those benefits are undermined if American researchers are compelled to participate in Chinese research programs rather than those in the United States. ‍

The Rule does not contemplate the potential waste of billions of dollars in taxpayer money if a project is rendered inviable due to the program’s objectives being finished in an adversarial country, first, as a result of actions taken by the Office of Management and Budget as a result of this haphazardly designed and implemented rule.

LBNF/DUNE is a large U.S. investment but it is not unique. Consider that scientists receive federal awards from NASA, the National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy, and other government agencies to participate in research on the International Space Station, a $150 billion research facility that cannot operate without the involvement of the Russian Federation due to the codependency of its components[25]. Once complete, scientists will also be reliant on federal awards to participate in research at the ITER fusion research facility, which the Administration requested $77.5 million dollars for in FY2026 funding after billions of dollars having already been spent by the U.S. government. Should the Administration choose to withdraw from ITER, American scientists would become reliant on long-pulse experimental capabilities that are currently exclusively available overseas, including the EAST and BEST reactors in China[26]. This is to say nothing of the hundreds of ongoing projects and facilities supported across the federal government that contribute to a globally interconnected research and development ecosystem.

‍Other risks to large science projects beyond 200.220 include the risks to major projects that could be introduced by the arbitrary termination of awards (200.340), the use of awards as political retribution[27] (200.205), the significant increase in agency backlogs[28] as senior political appointees are forced to review each and every award issued by an agency (200.205), and so on. Because these projects often include complex arrangements of federal funding across agencies and years, even a minor project delivery disruption can have long-lasting unintended impacts.

The costs of the potential regulation documented in 200.220 far exceed “time costs for staff.” They include the viability of major programs and projects, introduce new risks to national security and localities that are reliant on economic activity generated by our national laboratories, whose research is funded by awards covered under 2 CFR 200.

Inconsistency and Unpredictability Will Undermine Foreign Partnerships that Benefit American Scientific Endeavors and Taxpayers

As discussed earlier, scientific endeavors require significant sustained investment over extended periods of time. International partnerships akin to LBNF/DUNE, the International Space Station, and the ITER fusion facility, or even mid- or small-scale endeavors supported by grants provided by the National Science Foundation are only possible when multiple processes in multiple countries come to the same conclusion and achieve their milestones simultaneously. The uncertainty introduced by requiring senior political sign-off (likely bottlenecked as has been the case across the government for the past 12 months) and arbitrary termination will undermine the ability of foreign partners to commit in-kind resources to U.S. experiments and facilities. This will inevitably create greater burden on the American taxpayer and potentially denying scientists access to unique resources or expertise that are not present in our borders.

Further, the ideological requirements established by the Rule will inevitably create incompatibilities with rules governing foreign grants. For instance, the European Union’s Horizon Europe research program, which is available to members of the European Union and researchers in dozens of “associated countries” (including all of the United States’ Five Eyes intelligence allies) include gender equality plan requirements[29] that conflict with the new requirements introduced in 200.218 and 200.300. Given that the rules for these programs are legislated by their governments and updated on fixed timelines[30], it is unlikely that the policy preferences of this administration will shape research programs that begin as the 47th presidency is transitioning out of office. It is worth exploring whether the introduction of uncompromising ideological requirements for research and development activities is worth sacrificing American’s access to international sources of knowledge and material resources at additional cost to the U.S. taxpayer.

Again, these considerations are entirely absent from the RIA. The TRAPPIST-1 discovery of exoplanets made of rock and water, announced by NASA during the first Trump Administration[31], was funded by the European Union’s European Research Council[32]. The first image of a black hole, again celebrated by the first Trump Administration[33], was made only possible due to grants and other types of awards made by other countries as a precondition for successful interferometry. ‍

A responsibly-drafted RIA would need to acknowledge the fact that this Rule, in order to keep pace in the globally competitive science and technology ecosystem, will have costs to the ability of the United States to engage in certain science and technology activities that cross borders as a matter of physical necessity. It would also need to take into account the potential cost to the U.S. taxpayer to replicate capabilities that do not exist in the United States. These costs, on their own, can have significant economic impact, such as the more than $200 million in in-kind contributions provided to the United States by the United Kingdom and Indian governments for LBNF/DUNE described, earlier. Finally, the explanation provided by the RIA would need to take into account the long-term viability of those projects if such contributions were delayed, and the waste in government expenditure created by the introduction of requirements that render congressionally-authorized and appropriated U.S. investments non-viable.

‍ Conclusion

The regulation’s impacts on science and technology extend far beyond questions of whether or not it is germane for political appointees to be involved in grant-making decisions or whether early grant termination is important and necessary. The act of simply applying the regulation as written could have substantial and permanent unintended consequences to American security measured in the billions, if not trillions. These consequences include severing the United States from the global research and development ecosystem without substantial work on the part of both the Office of Management and Budget and implementing agencies to clarify the scope of the regulation. This speaks to the poor craftsmanship and lack of situational awareness involved in developing the regulation, not to mention a lack of attention to detail by those involved in the review process prior to the document being posted on the Federal Register for comment.

As such, I urge that the Office of Management and Budget withdraw the document.

Cole Donovan

Director of Policy and Advocacy, Stand Up for Science Foundation

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[1] This comment fully supports the comments of others making such arguments, particularly those which point out the degree to which the Rule suppresses First Amendment rights and makes claims that are easily empirical disproven (such as the “biological reality of the sex binary”, given that many intersex biological outcomes exist in the medical literature).

[2]https://lbnf-dune.fnal.gov/

[3]https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-united-states-government-supported-research-development-national-security-policy/

[4]https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346/text

[5]https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/OSTP-Foreign-Talent-Recruitment-Program-Guidelines.pdf

[6]https://www.dodcui.mil/NOFORN/

[7] See the Circular 175 process at the State Department, which had the effect of bottlenecking major collaborations for scientific projects due to inadequate staffing in science and treaty offices. One of the primary outcomes that I observed involved science agencies developing alternative arrangements to avoid reviews required by the Case-Zablocki Act.

[8]https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-united-kingdom-of-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-regarding-the-technology-prosperity-de/

[9]https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346/text

[10] A note about the contained analysis: The document contains assertions about the importance of specific experimental capabilities for the United States to remain in a leading position in science and technology. Artificial intelligence proponents, including those commenting on the Genesis Mission, have suggested that AI could fill this role instead. This is misguided, as theories developed by AI still need to be tested using experimental platforms even if we assume the possibility of AGI or super intelligence by the end of the decade. Further, AI and machine learning are already being deployed to enhance many of the capabilities described in the document. The capabilities of LBNF/DUNE, in particular, are dependent both on geographic and geologic scale.

[11]https://www.science.org/content/article/their-budget-already-stretched-near-bursting-u-s-particle-physicists-dream-small

[12]https://lbnf-dune.fnal.gov/for-neighbor-and-businesses/for-our-south-dakota-neighbors/

[13]https://lbnf-dune.fnal.gov/for-neighbor-and-businesses/for-our-illinois-neighbors/

[14]https://neutrino.web.cern.ch/experiments/proto-dune/

[15]https://news.fnal.gov/wp-content/uploads/dune_fact_sheet.pdf

[16]https://www-sk.icrr.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/hk/

[17]https://www.science.org/content/article/first-results-put-neutrino-experiment-china-track-breakthrough

[18]https://news.fnal.gov/wp-content/uploads/lbnf-economic-impact.pdf

[19]https://www.aip.org/fyi/particle-physics-panel-assesses-us-influence-on-global-stage

[20]https://news.fnal.gov/2023/08/indian-scientists-come-to-fermilab-to-assist-with-pip-ii-particle-accelerator-technology/

[21]https://news.fnal.gov/2026/03/fermilabs-pip-ii-accelerator-project-recognized-at-uk-us-research-showcase/

[22]https://issues.org/science-diplomacy-donovan/