Stand Up for Science Foundation Comment Response to National Science Foundation Guidance on Financial Assistance (NSF-2026-OTR-0001)

By Cole Donovan, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Stand Up for Science Foundation

Bottom Line Up Front: If Congress does not hide elephants in mouse holes[1], then it did not grant the National Science Foundation (NSF) the authority to implement sweeping regulatory control over American institutes of higher education (IHEs) through an information collection. From 1991 to December 2025, there have been 324 changes to administrative requirements associated with federal grants, with 66 percent of those requirements being issued in the past decade[2]. Several provisions raise additional legal and practical concerns. Among other issues, the GFA removes requirements tied to statutory civil rights obligations under the Rehabilitation Act and Title IX, and proposed restrictions on international collaboration conflict with carveouts established in the CHIPS and Science Act.

Taken together, these measures transform a routine information collection into a regulation with significant economic impact, triggering both the analytical requirements of Executive Order 12866 and the major questions doctrine. NSF has not identified the statutory basis for imposing these sweeping behavioral and operational requirements on universities, nor has it conducted the necessary regulatory impact analysis. The proposal should be withdrawn.

There are also urgent matters of practical application that need to be addressed, like how the NSF intends to conduct political review of documents when there are no political appointees, and how and to what extent the requirements of the GFA also apply to awards granted using other transactions authority.

Comment

The Stand Up for Science Foundation is responding to the NSF Guidance on Financial Assistance (GFA), replacing the Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide (PAPPG). NSF has requested comments on:

(a)   whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility;

(b)   the accuracy of the Agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information;

(c)   ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology;

(d)   ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and

(e)   feedback on the new design and display of information for users.

The Stand Up for Science Foundation comments that alignment of NSF policy to applicable executive orders and the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) proposed revisions to 2 CFR 200 (OMB-2026-0034, hereinafter referred to as “OMB regulation”) is premature given ongoing litigation over the President’s executive orders.  It includes multiple provisions that are either enjoined or otherwise limited by the courts. Likewise, the OMB regulation is not final and has been the subject of tens of thousands of comments that will need to be adjudicated before the regulation is implemented. The Stand Up for Science Foundation therefore requests the withdrawal of GFA at least until OMB issues its final agency action.

Practical Application: The combination of the OMB regulation and NSF’s leadership structure raises some immediate questions and concerns relevant to every organization that might seek financial assistance from the organization: How does the NSF intend to navigate the OMB regulation’s requirement that all awards be reviewed by a senior political appointee when the Foundation does not have any senior political appointees? Ordinarily, a government agency would be able to depend on a delegation of authority, but in this case, the complete absence of any political appointees raises the question of whether the NSF is able to issue awards if there is no appointee to review them. Unlike other sections in the regulation, this requirement makes no mention of possible delegation to other officials. It would be unacceptable for the administration to hold that the NSF could not issue awards until a director is confirmed. The NSF should issue immediate clarification about how pre-issuance reviews under the OMB regulation will be conducted without the presence of a senior political official to ensure that the issuance of $8.75 billion dollars is not further disrupted.

Further, the NSF should offer clarification about how the agency’s one senate-confirmed political appointee (the Director) intends to review thousands of grants under the OMB’s pre-issuance review requirement, or if the NSF intends to hire additional political staff to manage the review process. NSF should also describe mechanisms for oversight of political appointee decisions to ensure public accountability for decisions that may advance national health, prosperity, and welfare; and secure the national defense—the core mission of the agency. The strength of the merit review system stems, in part, from the systems of accountability that accompany it. Deferring decisions to a political appointee who has not been confirmed by senate without adequate oversight and recordkeeping is likely to increase the risk of cronyism, waste, fraud, and abuse as opposed to mitigating such risks. Likewise, increasing the number of unconfirmed political appointees at the NSF would have significant consequences regarding the governance of the agency, and it is in the interests of the public and potential grantees to understand any such structural changes.

The Stand Up for Science Foundation requests how the GFA and OMB regulation interact with awards made under “other transactions authority.” Given the significant new administrative requirements issued under the OMB regulation, there is significant potential to stack the deck in favor of awards with minimal oversight mechanisms to politically favored entities. Clarification with respect to how the Foundation expects to conduct oversight of entities receiving awards under other transactions authority is necessary to ensure accountability for federal awards.

The NSF is not a Regulator: The Stand Up for Science Foundation notes that the collection of information is necessary for the NSF to function as an extramural science funding agency, insofar as it is necessary to receive and collect proposals to determine whether an award of federal financial assistance is warranted. These information collections should be limited to information that is required for the execution of a grant or cooperative agreement and laws that have been passed by Congress.

However, the Stand Up for Science Foundation estimates that when coupled with the requirements of the not-finalized OMB regulation and other various requirements (including those found in National Security Presidential Memorandum 33), the information collection becomes a primary vehicle for regulating the behavior of higher education institutions and non-profit research organizations that rely on federal financial assistance. Consequently, the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed information, which assumes 120 hours expended for each proposal submitted, is in fact far greater, and should be treated instead as a regulation with significant economic impact. The estimate of 120 hours is not credible, especially when workload surveys from the Federal Demonstration Partnership suggests that 44.3% of researchers’ active time involves meeting administrative requirements as opposed to conducting research[3]. This does not include the additional costs of new full-time positions at universities in order to meet newer federal requirements[4].

The President’s executive orders, combined with the new requirements from the OMB regulation and the revisions to the GFA, create an excess of new red tape and institutional requirements. The Council on Government Relations (COGR) found that the implementation of the President’s executive order 14222, alone, created additional redundant checkpoints in the implementation of federal awards, resulting in an additional 53,734 hours of work, "simply to process payments to low-risk institutions for projects and costs previously approved by the agency[5]." As noted in the Federation of American Scientists’ comment on the Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance, based on the National Institutes of Health per-publication cost of $2,565-$3,104 per award and estimating between 5.7 and 6.9 publications per award, the potential additional financial burden placed on institutions by implementing the revised 2 CFR 200.461 would create an additional annual financial burden on research institutions of $125-185 million. The Council on Government Relations phase one survey of the cost of complying with research security disclosure requirements, likewise, estimated that the total compliance costs for mid-to-large size institutions with federal research funding over $100 million would be expected to spend an additional $51.5 million implementing research security requirements necessary to receive federal financial assistance from institutions like the National Science Foundation[6]. Because these institutions are reliant on federal financial assistance for their continued operations, this effectively transforms what is otherwise an information collection into a regulation with significant economic impact.

Likewise, it is impossible to assess the GFA without also considering the OMB regulation’s significant new requirements that flow from the proposed regulation (currently undergoing comment review) to organizations seeking funding from the NSF. This is particularly true with respect to the pre-issuance review of awards, reviews of individuals’ “history of questionable practices” and prohibitions on “issue advocacy,” which subsequently includes a list of undefined terms that are not tied to objective or evidentiary standards. This creates a standard of expected behavior that institutions that are reliant on federal funds must meet to qualify for federal awards that extend far beyond the scope of whether the organization or individual in question is able to execute a grant or cooperative agreement for a research and development activity. As noted in the Association of American Universities comment on the proposed OMB regulation, “Conditioning federal research funding on an institution's associational and expressive choices is not risk management. It is the use of the federal funding relationship to penalize protected activity, which conflicts with the First Amendment[7].”

What is also concerning are the ways that the GFA removes requirements from grants that are necessary to ensure compliance with existing law.  For instance, the Rehabilitation Act (29 USC 794) “prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance[8]” while Title IX (20 USC 1681) prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex “under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  The GFA withdraws the requirements for the designation of coordinators responsible for ensuring institutional compliance with these foundational civil rights laws. The OMB regulation also introduces new restrictions on international collaboration in a newly proposed 2 CFR 200.220 which are inconsistent with carveouts for international cooperation established under the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (Section 10632(d))[9]. While it is true that these statutory requirements would still elevate the GFA to a regulation, given the potential impact on the operations and spending of institutions beyond the scope of activities covered by the grant, these requirements are grounded firmly in legislated requirements, as opposed to policy preferences of the administration which are currently being challenged in court.

Again, when such requirements are placed on institutions that rely on federal funding, the information collection transforms from a mechanism for creating a record of public accountability with respect to federal funding into a mechanism that regulates institutional and individual behavior. Even without consideration of the serious constitutional issues raised by the OMB regulation, Congress certainly has not authorized NSF to act as the vehicle to impose many of the new extracurricular requirements resulting from the President’s executive orders on IHEs beyond the scope of the grant or cooperative agreement.

The Stand Up for Science Foundation additionally requests:

•   Withdrawal of the information collection and for NSF to conduct a more thorough regulatory impact analysis that assesses the regulatory impact on institutions reliant on federal financial assistance

•   That the NSF identify the statutory basis, as required by the major questions doctrine[10], of significant requirements that institutions reliant on federal financial assistance would be required to implement as a result of accepting federal financial assistance.

•   That any future actions taken by the National Science Foundation to modify the PAPPG or GFA follow the requirements established under Executive Order 12866[11].

Since the GFA was posted to the Federal Register and regulations.gov, the National Science Foundation has also issued a dear colleague letter on the prohibition of collaborations with restricted entities, which includes a prohibition that senior or key personnel be prohibited from holding an appointment or position with or receiving research support from restricted entities for the duration of the NSF award. While the NSF has not provided further information on the potential impact associated with implementing these additional prohibitions, the costs of compliance are likely greater than zero.

The Stand Up for Science Foundation also notes the peculiar nature of some of these requirements - for instance, the requirement states that “appropriated funds shall not be used for grants, contracts, other transactions, or other assistance to an organization if the purpose is to conduct research in collaboration with restricted entities.” Among the entities described in the list include “Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act” list produced by the Federal Communications Commission. Among these services and equipment includes cybersecurity and anti-virus software produced by Kaspersky Lab, foreign produced “Toy Drones”, and “routers produced in a foreign country.” It is unclear how a research institution is expected to certify that they will not collaborate with toy drones or foreign routers.

In addition to these requirements, the Stand Up for Science Foundation notes the forthcoming requirements for research security programs under National Security Memorandum 33, which entities reliant on federal financial assistance would be required to also implement. Before issuing large, financially intensive requirements for universities that they would have to implement without federal financial support as a condition of receiving federal funds, the Stand Up for Science Foundation requests identification of the statutory authorization granting such authority to the NSF. While it is true that the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 provides support for the development of certain research security elements, such as trainings, it also provides universities with guidelines (as opposed to requirements) “to use in developing their own training programs to address the unique needs, challenges, and risk profiles of such institutions and other organizations[12].” Again, this language points to the ability of the government to provide guidance to universities, as opposed to regulatory requirements that far exceed the authorities granted by Congress.

Conclusion: The Stand Up for Science Foundation, again, requests that the GFA be withdrawn until these additional requirements, which are expected to create new and additional financial burdens for institutions reliant on federal financial assistance from the National Science Foundation, can be identified and evaluated given the additional economic impact they are expected to place on research institutions. The proper way to minimize the burden of the collection of information is for the NSF to focus on those requests that are necessary to determine whether a science grant or cooperative agreement is warranted.

For future versions of the PAPPG, the NSF should explicitly cite the statutory authority granting the ability to regulate conduct and speech at institutions of higher education, and provide clarity on how it intends to navigate provisions spelled out in the uniform guidance, and describe how the NSF intends to navigate any provisions in 2 CFR that may tread on Constitutional protections, particularly those relating to equal protection under the law, free speech, and freedom of association and assembly.

[1]https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/99-1257P.ZO

[2]https://www.cogr.edu/blog/changes-federal-research-requirements-1991

[3]https://thefdp.org/wp-content/uploads/FDP-FWS-2018-Primary-Report.pdf

[4]https://www.cogr.edu/blog/institutional-cost-compliance-administrative-burden-where-do-we-go-here-october-2023-meeting

[5]https://www.cogr.edu/blog/administrative-burden-defend-spend-ncura-magazine-december-2025

[6]https://www.cogr.edu/blog/research-security-and-cost-compliance-phase-i-report-disclosure-requirements-now-available

[7]https://www.aau.edu/key-issues/aau-comments-ombs-uniform-guidance-rule

[8]https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29/794

[9]https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346/text/statute?format=txt

[10]https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12077

[11]https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_13563.pdf

[12]https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346/text/statute?format=txt

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